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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant, Evelyn Adorno ("Adorno"), appeals two orders 
of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey in favor of appellee, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services ("Secretary").  In its orders, the district court 
affirmed the Secretary's final decision to deny Adorno disability 
benefits and denied Adorno's motion for reconsideration.  Because 
the findings of fact on which the Administrative Law Judge 
("ALJ") based its decision are logically inconsistent and 
contradictory, we will vacate the district court's order 
affirming the Secretary's decision and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  On remand, the ALJ 
should reconcile the contradictions based on all the evidence in 
the record, including Adorno's claimed inability to tolerate 
exposure to dust and fumes, and any additional relevant evidence 
the parties may produce and, if he again elects to reject the 
  
medical opinions of Adorno's treating physicians, state his 
reasons for doing so. 
 
 I. 
 In April, 1990, Adorno filed applications with the 
Social Security Administration ("SSA") for disability benefits 
or, in the alternative, supplemental security income ("SSI") 
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.  She alleged 
that she had been disabled by the combined effects of asthma, 
arthritis, and hypertension since June 15, 1989.  Adorno's 
applications for benefits were denied by the SSA initially and 
upon reconsideration. 
 On December 24, 1990, Adorno filed a request for a 
hearing before an ALJ.  It was granted, and the hearing was held 
on February 13, 1991.  Represented by counsel, she appeared and 
testified on her own behalf through an interpreter. 
 On May 29, 1991, the ALJ determined that Adorno was not 
disabled and, therefore, could not receive either disability 
benefits or SSI.  The ALJ's decision became final on May 27, 1992 
when the Appeals Council denied Adorno's request for review.  
Adorno then filed a complaint in the district court, pursuant to 
42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West 1991), asking the court to review and 
set aside the Secretary's decision.  On October 7, 1993, the 
district court affirmed the Secretary's final decision finding 
  
Adorno not disabled.  On December 6, 1993, the district court 
denied Adorno's motion for reconsideration.1   
 Adorno came to the continental United States from 
Puerto Rico.  When asked by the ALJ how long she had "been in 
this country," she replied 30 years.  Administrative Record 
("Admin. Rec.") at 30.  She was 49 years of age on the date of 
the ALJ's hearing.  In Puerto Rico, she completed only the second 
grade and has had no other formal education.  She testified that 
she cannot speak or read English. 
 From 1968 to 1989, Adorno worked for Excell Wood as a 
machine operator and general laborer.  She claims that the dust 
and fumes encountered at work required her to use asthma 
medicine.  After leaving Excell Wood, Adorno worked briefly as a 
packer at Papco Industries, but claims that she had to stop 
working after only four weeks because of her asthma condition.  
Most recently, Adorno worked at Fluid Chemicals but after one 
week its factory closed because of poor ventilation.  She has not 
engaged in substantial gainful employment since June 15, 1989. 
 Since March 1987, Jose R. Sanchez-Pena, M.D. has been 
Adorno's treating physician.  On Adorno's initial visit, Dr. 
Sanchez-Pena performed a pulmonary function test and concluded 
that Adorno was suffering from a "moderate asthmatic condition."  
After eighteen visits, Dr. Sanchez-Pena added the afflictions of 
arthritis, bursitis, pneumonia and kidney stones to the asthma, 
                     
1
.  Although Adorno lists incorrect dates in her brief, it 
appears that she appeals both of these orders. 
 
  
which he now found to be acute.  In a letter dated March 30, 
1990, Dr. Sanchez-Pena stated that Adorno was permanently and 
totally disabled. 
 Adorno also provided a note dated March 29, 1990 from 
another treating physician, Alfonso Polanco, M.D.  It stated that 
Adorno "has been a patient at this office for acute bronchial 
asthma."  Admin. Rec. at 100.  In response to a request from the 
Division of Disability Determinations ("DDD"), Dr. Polanco sent a 
copy of his office notes.  They showed that Adorno was seen on 
four occasions in 1989 and 1990 and was treated with Proventil 
Inhaler, Proventil Repetabs, Theo-Dur and Vasotec for acute 
bronchial asthma.  Id. at 98-99.2 Neither the ALJ nor the 
district court referred to this evidence. 
 In February 1989, Adorno visited a physician named 
Leslie Aufseeser, D.P.M., for treatment of bone spurs in her 
heel.  Dr. Aufseeser noted in her report that Adorno wanted to 
undergo surgery but postponed it because of uncertainty over 
insurance coverage. 
 On July 11, 1990, the DDD referred Adorno to a 
consulting physician named Santangelo for a physical 
                     
2
.  Proventil Inhaler is used "for the prevention and relief of 
bronchospasm in patients with reversible obstructive airway 
disease and for the prevention of exercise-induced bronchospasm."  
Physicians' Desk Reference 2211 (47th ed. 1993).  Proventil 
Repetabs are "for the relief of bronchospasm in patients with 
reversible obstructive airway disease."  Id. at 2213.  Theo-Dur 
is "[f]or relief and/or prevention of symptoms from asthma and 
reversible bronchospasm associated with chronic bronchitis and 
emphysema."  Id. at 1192.  Vasotec is "for treatment of 
hypertension."  Id. at 1621. 
  
examination.3  Based on an examination and a pulmonary function 
test, Dr. Santangelo diagnosed Adorno as suffering from a 
fifteen-year history of asthma and uncontrolled hypertension.  
Dr. Santangelo's report indicated however that the pulmonary 
function tests administered to Adorno were within normal limits.  
In Dr. Santangelo's opinion, Adorno could perform any type of 
work except work in heavy fumes or dusty environments.  Dr. 
Santangelo disagreed with Dr. Sanchez-Pena's and Dr. Polanco's 
conclusion that Adorno suffered from acute asthma.  Adorno was 
also treated in hospital emergency rooms on several occasions, 
including two visits on March 19, 1987 and October 10, 1988 for 
asthma attacks.4    
 Although Dr. Sanchez-Pena's initial diagnosis of 
moderate asthma was based on objective scientific data provided 
by a pulmonary function test, the ALJ concluded this doctor's 
later diagnosis of "acute asthma" lacked objective data to 
support it.  The ALJ found Dr. Santangelo's medical report more 
reliable than Dr. Sanchez-Pena's later diagnosis because it was 
based on a later pulmonary functions test and a physical 
examination. 
 
                     
3
.  Dr. Santangelo's full name is not in the record.  Adorno v. 
Shalala, Civ. No. 92-1783, slip op. at 3 n.2 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 
1993). 
4
.  One other incident involved what the district court labeled a 
"perturbed, overly-aggressive pet rooster."  Adorno, slip op. at 
3. 
 
  
 II. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
review the final decision of the Secretary denying Adorno's 
application for disability benefits under 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) 
(West 1991) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1383(c)(3) (West 1992).  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the district court's final 
judgment in favor of the Secretary under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 
1993). 
 "Our standard of review, as was the district court's, 
is whether the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record."  Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion."  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) 
(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 
(1938)). 
 
 III. 
 "The Social Security Act defines disability in terms of 
the effect a physical or mental impairment has on a person's 
ability to function in the workplace."  Heckler v. Campbell, 461 
U.S. 460, 460 (1983); 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(c) (West 1991).  
Disability benefits are provided for individuals unable "to 
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
  
months."  42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(1)(A) (West 1991); Campbell, 461 
U.S. at 460.  A person is determined to be disabled only if "his 
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity 
that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in 
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 
national economy."  42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(2)(A); Campbell, 461 
U.S. at 460. 
 The regulations promulgated by the Secretary to 
implement these definitions recognize that certain impairments, 
called listed impairments, are so severe that they are presumed 
to prevent a person from pursuing any gainful work without 
further proof of occupational disability.  Campbell, 461 U.S. at 
460 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (1982)).  Thus, a claimant 
who establishes that she suffers from a listed impairment is 
deemed disabled without further inquiry.  Id.  If a claimant can 
pursue her former occupation, she is not entitled to disability 
benefits.  Id.  If a claimant suffers from a severe, but unlisted 
impairment, or a combination of impairments, the Secretary must 
consider the individual's particular limitations to determine 
whether the claimant retains the ability to perform either her 
former work or some less demanding employment.  Id. 
 Adorno, in her first hearing, introduced evidence of 
only three episodes of asthma over 3-1/2 years.  This does not 
meet the level of severity required for a listed impairment.  See 
20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 3.03B.  For asthma, the 
  
listings require acute episodes at least once every two months or 
on average at least six times a year.  Id. 
 Adorno thus had the initial burden of proving that she 
could not pursue her former occupation.  Once a claimant 
establishes her inability to pursue her former occupation, the 
burden shifts to the Secretary to prove that she retains the 
capacity to pursue less demanding work.  See id. (citing 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1)). 
 Adorno argues that the district court erred in 
affirming the Secretary's decision to deny her disability 
benefits because the ALJ did not make findings of fact concerning 
the nature and demands of her former occupation.  Because her 
undisputed testimony shows her former job exposed her to fumes 
and heavy dust, and uncontradicted medical evidence shows her 
asthma precludes such exposure, Adorno contends that the ALJ's 
determination that she can return to her former job, but not one 
that exposes her to dust and fumes, is logically inconsistent. 
 The Secretary, in an effort to make sense of the ALJ's 
decision seeks to recharacterize Adorno's prior job as a 
cabinetmaker.  Brief of Appellee at 18-19.  The Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles does not list dust and fumes as hazards which 
accompany a cabinetmaker's job.  This attempt to redefine 
Adorno's former occupation is unsupported by substantial evidence 
on the whole record.  Both the ALJ and the district court 
describe Adorno's work as a machine operator, which may describe 
Adorno's former work more aptly.  See Admin. Rec. at 11, 14; 
  
Adorno, slip op. at 2.5  The contradiction between this finding 
and Adorno's uncontradicted testimony about her exposure to dust 
and fumes must be reconciled. 
 If it appears that Adorno cannot return to her former 
occupation of machine operator, the ALJ must then determine what 
type of work Adorno can do in order to see whether her case fits 
into one of the so-called "grids" designed mechanically to take 
into account the factors of education, age, skills, and physical 
ability which affect an impaired claimants employability.  See 
Campbell, 461 U.S. at 461-62.  On this question, the ALJ found 
that "within these restrictions the claimant is able to perform 
her prior work as a machine operator or the full range of light 
work activity."  Admin. Rec. at 14.   
 The job of a machine operator is listed as medium work 
in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.  Appellant's Appendix 
("App.") at 1.  Accordingly, it is impossible to tell whether 
Adorno is limited to light or medium work.  The ALJ failed to 
make an unambiguous finding about the kind of work Adorno could 
do, and whether such work is available.  Such finding is a 
prerequisite to the proper application of the "grids." 
 Moreover, the ALJ's discussion of age and education is 
in only the most conclusory terms and is also tied to his 
conclusion that Adorno can do a full range of light work.  Absent 
from the ALJ's decision is any mention of Adorno's physical 
                     
5
.  At one point, however, the district court also calls Adorno a 
"general laborer."  Adorno, slip op. at 2. 
  
abilities.   A full inquiry into Adorno's skills and limitations, 
followed by an assessment of alternate work options in light of 
those abilities and limitations, is crucial to any logical 
analysis of her case.  The ALJ failed to conduct that inquiry and 
also failed clearly to relate Adorno's physical impairment(s) to 
her prior occupation.  On remand, the Secretary must determine, 
on the basis of substantial evidence, what Adorno's prior 
occupation was and what types of work her abilities and 
limitations permit.  "The regulations divide this last inquiry 
into two stages."  Campbell, 461 U.S. at 460.  The Secretary must 
first assess each claimant's present job qualifications in light 
of the various factors Congress has identified as relevant: 
physical ability, age, education, and work experience.  Id.  The 
regulations then require the Secretary to make an individual 
assessment of each claimant's abilities and limitations.  Id.  
This generally requires an opinion from a vocational expert, 
given in response to a hypothetical question incorporating the 
physical and occupational limitations that the record shows the 
claimant suffers from. 
 The ALJ did consider some of Adorno's particular 
limitations.  He found that Adorno has "the residual functional 
capacity to perform work-related activities except for work 
involving heavy exposure to dust and fumes," and that her "past 
relevant work as a machine operator did not require the 
performance of work-related activities precluded by the above 
limitation."  Admin. Rec. at 14-15.  We have already mentioned 
the problem with this finding.  It does not appear to be 
  
supported by substantial evidence.  The Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles lists "Machinist, wood" as work accompanied 
by fumes and dust.  App. at 2. 
 We also note the ALJ's failure to weigh appropriately 
the testimony of both of Adorno's attending physicians.  In 
considering a claim for disability benefits, greater weight 
should be given to the findings of a treating physician than to a 
physician who has examined the claimant as a consultant.  See, 
e.g., Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993).  We 
recognize, of course, that a statement by a plaintiff's treating 
physician supporting an assertion that she is "disabled" or 
"unable to work" is not dispositive of the issue.  Wright v. 
Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 1990).  The ALJ must review 
all the medical findings and other evidence presented in support 
of the attending physician's opinion of total disability.  Id.  
In doing so, the ALJ must weigh the relative worth of a treating 
physician's report against the reports submitted by other 
physicians who have examined the claimant.  See Cotter v. Harris, 
642 F.2d 700, 705, reh'g denied, 650 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 The record indicates that Dr. Sanchez-Pena and Dr. 
Polanco are Adorno's treating physicians.  The ALJ and the 
district court addressed only the opinion of Dr. Sanchez-Pena, 
and concluded it was not entitled to significant weight.  See 
Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) (an 
unsupported diagnosis is not entitled to significant weight).  
Adorno, however, also points to the testimony of Dr. Polanco and 
argues that the Secretary failed to give it the weight it 
  
deserved.  In the ALJ's decision, he states that he made his 
findings "[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record,"  
Admin. Rec. at 14, but the ALJ did not otherwise explain his 
reasons for not mentioning Dr. Polanco's note indicating that 
Adorno was treated for "acute asthma." 
 Adorno relies primarily on the proposition that the 
Secretary must "explicitly" weigh all relevant, probative and 
available evidence.  Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 
(3d Cir. 1979); see also Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 584 
(3d Cir. 1986); Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705.  The Secretary must 
provide some explanation for a rejection of probative evidence 
which would suggest a contrary disposition.  Brewster, 786 F.2d 
at 585.  The Secretary may properly accept some parts of the 
medical evidence and reject other parts, but she must consider 
all the evidence and give some reason for discounting the 
evidence she rejects.  Stewart v. Secretary of H.E.W., 714 F.2d 
287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 For these reasons, we will vacate the district court's 
order and remand for further proceedings.  On remand, if Adorno 
has carried her initial burden of establishing an impairment so 
severe that she cannot perform the kind of work in which she was 
previously engaged, the Secretary has the burden of supplying 
substantial evidence, usually in the form of a vocational 
expert's opinion, that establishes Adorno's ability to perform 
other substantial gainful activity despite her physical problems, 
limited education, her difficulties with English and her limited 
occupational skills. 
  
 
 IV. 
 The order of the district court granting summary 
judgment to the Secretary will be reversed and the case remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
